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Summary
An expression is derived for the net present value of returns obtained through increased
productivity  of descendants  of a  purchased  sire.  This  expression  is useful  for evaluating a  given
sire purchase, but is not so helpful in determining a sire buying policy. For this purpose, an
analysis is made  of the value of sire purchase from a breeding nucleus which  is making  constant
genetic gains when  the lag of the commercial  population behind the nucleus has  stabilised under
a fixed policy.  This  leads  to a  criterion  for deciding  how  long a  sire should  be  used, which  depends
on price, breeding value, and rate of genetic gain in the nucleus.  The optimum sire buying
policy depends on the relation between price and breeding value of the sire.  Competition for
sires may  change the relationship of price to breeding value so that no class of sire is the best
buy  if properly used and  it is shown that in this case price is a quadratic function of breeding
value.
Prices paid by producers for boars auctioned from French performance test stations were
found to be related to index value (I)  by the approximate equation :
price  (francs) 
=  1  5 00   !- 5(I-  100 )  + 0 . 5   (I-  100 ) 2 .
For the observed price function the best policy is to buy  boars with high (about 14 o)  index
value, and  replace them  after r 5   months  use.  The  net present value of an average boar  is esti-
mated as 2  o 0 o  francs.
Introduction
Most economic assessments of animal breeding programs, such as those of
P OUTOUS   and V IS S A C  ( 19 6 2 ),  HILL ( 1971 ),  JAMES ( 197 2)  and  !r,s!N and M O C QUO T
( I974 )  have  dealt with  decisions made  in the breeding nucleus.  However, genetic
gains made  in the nucleus are mostly  realised by  gene flow into commercial popu-
lations and, therefore, the benefit of genetic gain is dependent on decisions made
( x )  On  leave from  present address : School  of Wool  and  Pastoral  Sciences, The  University  of  New  South
Wales Kensington, N.S.W., 2033 ,  Australia.by  owners of commercial stock to buy  breeding animals, normally sires, from the
breeding nucleus.  Thus  genetic gains made  in the nucleus will have a significant
impact on production to the extent that purchase of sires from the nucleus is
seen as a profitable use of resources by  owners of production stock. N APIER   and
Jorr!s ( 197 6)  have discussed the value of Australian merino rams by  calculating
the discounted value  of returns from  the  progeny  of a purchased ram.  However,
they ignored contributions to  later  generations,  and considered evaluation  of
a particular sire, rather than a sire buying policy.  Their approach may  thus be
more  relevant  to buying  a terminal  sire than  to purchase  of a  sire for purebreeding.
In this paper, the analysis of sire buying policies for purebred populations  will
be developed in relation to the rate of genetic gain being achieved in the nucleus,
and to the relative breeding value and price of available sires.
Evaluation  of  a  purchased sire
We  first  develop an expression for the value of a purchased sire,  given all
the conditions of  use.  This will be expressed  as present value of discounted
returns, comparing the purchased sire  with a randomly chosen male from the
commercial population or base.  The notation to be used in this paper is  listed
with definitions in the Appendix.
N  sires are used altogether at any one time, a fraction W  of them surviving
to the next time unit.  For simplicity,  survivals rate is  assumed independent
of age, and  time  units are referred to as periods.  The  maximum  number  of times
a sire  will be used is  T, provided he survives long enough.  If n replacement
sires  are  bought each period :
Thus, if C  is the purchase  cost per  sire, the expense  of sire buying each  period
is NC( I  -  W)  1( 1  
-  W T )  or NO  /T if there is no wastage.
If h  j  =  1 , 2 , 
....  F, are the genetic contributions of females of age j  to  the
progeny crop,  where ¿,fj 
= 0 . 5 ,  and each sire contributes an equal  number  of
i
offspring in any period,  it can be shown that the genetic contribution of a siie
to the progeny crop at time t  from its initial use is  e’ F t-I  e 12N, where
Using a discount rate d,  the contribution at time t  is multiplied by r  to  bring
it  to present value, where  r = i /(i  -!-  d),  and summing these discounted values
over all values of  t  gives rf’  (I 
-  y!)w e / 2 N. Letting J denote e’ (I 
- y F)- 1   e .
it  can be shown that : 
&dquo; &dquo;  &dquo;  &dquo;
The sire  will make a similar contribution at each subsequent mating in which
he is  used, and these can be combined after discounting by a further factor ofr for each time unit.  Allowing for wastage, the expected total genetic  contri-
bution  of  a  sire is  :
If it is expected that NP  progeny will be produced each period, the number of
discounted progeny genotypes expected from a sire is :
We  now  suppose returns from progeny are realised at an age Y  units in both
sexes.  There is  no real loss  of generality in this  assumption since,  if  returns
occur over several periods,  as in wool sheep, these can all be discounted back
to the same period and summed (H OPKINS   and JAMES, 1979 ).  If each unit of
breeding value is worth B  economic units per animal, the value  of  a  unit  of  breed-
ing  value in  the sire  is :
This remains true when W  =  i.  Since the sire cost is  C,  if he has a breeding
value R  relative to the mean of the base, his net present value is :
It is obvious from (i) that the larger T  is the greater is the net present value
of the sire,  as was noted by N APIER   and J ONES  ( 197 6)  in their example, and as
is clear from the fact that a sire contributes more descendants the longer he is
used.  However, the problem with trying  to  define  an optimum sire  buying
policy on the basis of this expression is  that the comparison of breeding value
is made with contemporary base bred males.  If the nucleus is making genetic
gains  there  will be  young  sires available  for purchase  which  are  genetically superior
to the sires already in use.  It is then likely that at some  value of T  the genetic
superiority  of young  nucleus  males  ovei the  oldest sires in use will be  great enough
to warrant the buying of these young sires as replacements for the old ones.  In
essence what  is missing from the above treatment is a recognition of the cost of
not replacing old sires by better young ones.  The stimulus to the nucleus to
produce genetic improvement is precisely the fact that if  it does not do so it is
in the interest of buyers to restrict their purchases of sires as far as possible.
Consideration  of  lag  costs
One of the difficulties with the method outlined in the previous section is
that the consequences of a single decision (sire purchase) over a long time period
ate taken into account under the assumption that subsequent actions are fixed.
If we  allow for possible variation in subsequent actions, then the value of present
actions will change.  For example, the effect  of selection made at a given time
depends on the generation length after selection has been made.  To evaluate
a  policy we  should  consider an  average  over many  periods.  The  simplest approach
is  to  consider an equilibrium  situation.  If  a producer continually buys sires
from a nucleus making constant genetic  gains,  his  population will  eventually
be improving at the same  rate as the nucleus, but will lag behind by an amount
depending on  generation length and selection differentials (B ICHARD ,  1971 ). The
mean  productivity of one population relative to another will depend on the diffe-rence between  their lags, so that the lag of a  population behind the nucleus should
be a good measure of its profitability.
If G  is the rate of genetic gain per time unit in the nucleus, C B   is the genetic
selection differential applied to breeding animals in the base, where  the  generation
length is I B ,  the genetic lag A  can be written, as shown by JAMES (1977), as :
If D MB   and d FB   are genetic selection differentials applied to nucleus born males
and base born females for use in the base;
and  if I MB   and 1 F ,  are  the average  ages of male and  female  parents used  in the  base :
Therefore :
.  If there were no lag at all,  the returns from the base in each period would
be increased by an amount NPBA, which we may  therefore call the «  lag cost ».
The lag cost may then be written as :
The value of 1 MB   depends on the sire replacement rate.  If there is no was-
tage and sires have equal numbers of progeny at ages a + 1, a +  2 , 
...  a !--  T,
I MB   is  a -f- ’/ 2 (T  -!-  i).  If the survival rate is W  per time unit, then :
The  cost of sires per  time  unit  is nC  where  n =  N  /T  if W  = Z  and  n = N(r -  W)  /
( I  
-  W T )  if W !  i.  The total cost per period, considering both lag cost and
sire purchase cost,  is :
The second of the three terms in this expression is  independent of sire buying
policy,  so  the variable  cost  is :
or when
We  shall suppose that sire cost, C, and sire selection differential, D m]3 ,  are fixed
and find the value of T which minimises the variable cost.  That is,  we seek
an optimum replacement rate for sires  of a given type.  We  later take up the
question of sire buying  policies when  cost and breeding value of sires are  variable.
It is convenient to express the cost in units of NPBG,  the increase in returns
per time unit, and  to express the sire selection differential as S, measured  in unitsof rate of genetic gain, where S 
= D MB  /G.  Also, the cost of a sire relative to
the increase in returns per sire per period will be denoted Q 
=  C  /PBG.  With
this  notation :
or,  when
We  then find :
For any given values of W and Q, there  is  an optimum number of periods of
use of a sire which minimises total cost.  This number is the solution of
The second expression is the limiting form of the first as W -  i, and shows that
as Q  increases, that  is, sires become  more  expensive relative to the genetic benefits
they confer, fewer sires should be bought each period.  The result when there
is wastage is  not so obvious from the equation, but numerical results are given
in table i,  showing the optimum T  values for a range of values of Q  and W.
In  general, solutions are not integers, but  this is not important, since T = 4 .5
can  be  interpreted as using half the sires 4   times and  half 5   times, though  wastage
makes this a little more complicated.  When Q  is  small, so that sires are cheap
relative to the rate of genetic improvement, sires should be turned over quickly,
and the optimum is  not much affected by the wastage rate,  essentially because
the  rapid turnover  does not allow time enough  for wastage  to produce  effects.  Butif  sires are expensive and should be used often, a high wastage rate means that
there are many  fewer  older sires than when  wastage  rate  is low, and  thus the  gene-
ration length and lag do not rise so rapidly with T.  Therefore sires should be
used more  often if possible when  wastage rates are high than when  they are low.
For example, when Q 
=  32 ,  a sire is used 8 times if W  =  i, but up to m. 3   times
if W  = 0 . 75 .  However, the average age of sires used is  lower (a  -!- 3 .55) when
W  =  0 . 75   than when W  =  z(a +  4.5).
Variation  in  price  and  breeding  value  of  sires
In the previous section we  considered costs for sires of  given  price and  breed-
ing value.  Except when sires were to be used very many times,  wastage rate
had little  effect  on optimum policy.  In this  section,  to  avoid mathematical
complications,  it  will be assumed there  is  no wastage of  sires.  However,  it
will be assumed that price and breeding value are variable.  The price of a sire
is  related to his breeding value by the function :
where k(o) 
=  i, so that Q a   is the value of Q  for a sire of average breeding value.
The variable  cost  equation may then be  written  as :
We can now consider variation  in  both  S and T.  First,
which is  the result of the previous section with Q  replaced by Qok(S).  Assum-
ing k(S)  is  an increasing  function of  S, this implies better sires should be used
longer than worse ones 
-  hardly a surprising result.
Second,
The effect of variation in S depends on the nature  of  the  function  k(S).  The
simplest assumption is  that k(S)  is  a linear function :
from which
Therefore if  T >  Q o b,  U  decreases as S increases, while if T  <  Q o b,  U  increases
as S increases.  Thus  for any  given value of T  it is best to have S either as large
or as small as possible.  There  is no  overall minimum,  in the mathematical  sense,
with  this form  of  k(S).  The  equations :
define a saddle point, not a minimum.  Another mathematical difficulty is that
with a linear function the price of very poor sires will be negative, the nucleuspaying the base to use very poor sires.  This seems unrealistic, but if the slope
of the line is not too great negative prices will occur only for values of S outside
the range of the population and thus are irrelevant.
A  numerical illustration of the relationship of U  to S and T when k(S)  is
linear is shown in table 2 , where  a =  i, Q o  
=  20   and  b =  o.i.  It  is  assumed
that S may  vary over the range ±10, corresponding to the top and bottom 5
per cent of nucleus males if the coefficient of variation of sire breeding values is
10   per cent and genetic gains are being made  at the rate of 2   per cent per period.
The value of b then corresponds to the top 5   per cent of sires having twice the
average  price, while the bottom 5   per cent have  zero price.  In  this case the solu-
tion of
is  given by
The table shows clearly that T =  2   marks the point at which U  does not
depend on S,  and also that T =  2 , S = -  9   is  a saddle point.  It is  also clear
that  the optimum  value  of T  increases with  S, the  value  of U  at this optimum  being
lower as S increases.  Under these conditions the best policy is to buy  the best
available sires and use them many  times, the total number  of times of use being
given by the  result  of  the  previous  section.
However, given this information, one would expect buyers to prefer sires
with high  breeding  values, and  the resulting demand would be expected to change
the nature of the function k(S).  In fact, one might expect that if there is a best
policy, in terms of S and T, and  this is known  to buyers, there would  be a greater
demand for sires with the optimum value of S,  with the result that the price
curve  k(S) would  be  pushed  into a form  in which  there was  no optimum  value  of S.
Returning to the partial derivatives, we see that for any S,  buyers should usesuch  sires T  times where T 2   = 2Qo k(S).  We  also want !! 
to be  zero so that it  is
possible to compensate for buying a poorer sire by getting it  cheaply enough.
The  condition  that au as 
=  o  is :
Ob
and making use of the relation between T and S :
The  solution of this differential equation under  the  condition h(O) 
=  I   is given  by :
Then we find :
from which :
Both  of these derivatives are zero when  T =  S + V 2Qo ,  and with this relationship
between S and T : 
-It  is  to be noted that k(S)  has a minimum at S = - 1 2Qo ,  being then zero,
implying that below  this point the price of sires increases as their breeding values
fall.  However,  in the  present context  this is irrelevant since such  sireswill never  be
bought.  In fact, since the minimum  use of sires is one period, the corresponding
value of S is  i 
-  !/2Qo, for  which C = !PBG.  The zero price  corresponds to
T =  o and thus is  irrelevant.  The relationship between U, S and T when  k (S)
has the equilibrium quadratic form is  shown table 3   for a =  i, Q o  
=  2 .
It is noticeable that with this price function, good sires are used very many
times because of their high cost.  However, the minimum overall cost  is  the
same, 3 . 5   NPBG, for  all  classes of sire provided the sires  are used the correct
number of times, S -!- 2 .  With this quadratic price function, the total cost can
be divided into  a lag  cost of NPBG   /  + T ! 1 - S)
B  /2  /
and a sire cost  of NC  /T which equals :
When the optimum policy is  used, T =  S -! V  2Q o   and the  sire  purchase  cost
is 1 / z   NPBG (S -f-  !2Qo).  Thus  the purchase  costs are still higher for purchasers
of genetically superior sires although fewer are bought.  On  the other hand lag
costs are NPBG  (a -!-  VQ./2 &mdash; ! S),  and are smaller when genetically  superior
sires are purchased.  The increase in generation length caused by longer use of
expensive sires  is not enough to negate the benefits of their genetic superiority,
so that the lag would be smaller in those populations which used very good sires
but kept them for  longer  periods.
In this discussion it  has been assumed that buyers compete, each knowing
the optimum strategy and each having the same breeding objective.  There is
then no economic advantage in buying sires of any particular quality, provided
they meet the minimum requirement S  >  i 
-  !2Qo,  and  that  sires  are used
an appropriate number  of times.  On  the other hand, if the price function differs
from  this ideal form, there will be some  class or classes of sires which  will be more
profitable to buy, and such classes can be identified using the type of analysis
used  here,  as  was done  for  a  linear  k(S).
Prices  of  boars  in  France
As  seen above, the  best policy for sire buyers depends on  the form  of the  price
function.  As an example of a price function, prices of boars sold at testing sta-
tions in France in the year r9 77  1 7 8  were investigated.  For  these sales, the data
available were the breed of boar (Large White or French I,andrace), the price
paid,  and the relative index values.  Relative index value is  calculated  as an
estimate of breeding value scaled to have an average of 100   and a standard  devia-
tion of 20   points.  In addition,  for each boar there was recorded the type of
buyer (breeder, A.I. centre or producer).  Prices paid by  breeders and  A.I. centres
are not relevant to the present discussion and  have  been excluded  from  this study.
Excluded boars tended to have high index values,  and though there was little
comparative information, may have been somewhat more expensive than boars
of similar index values bought by producers.  Altogether,  data were availablefor 6 1   sales held at 12   testing stations, giving prices for 6 97   Large White and 552
French  Landrace  boars.  Since all boars with an  index  value  below  100   are slaugh-
tered, the available data are for boars with index values of ioo or more.  There
are few  boars with index values above 140 ,  and  most  of  these  are  bought  by  breed-
ers or A.I. centres so our attention is  concentrated on index values from  ioo
to 140.
For any one index value,  prices  showed a considerable range,  and there
were occasional very high prices.  There also appeared on inspection to be some
differences between sales in prices paid for boars of the same index value, but
since our present purpose is  not to make a detailed analysis of boar prices the
data were pooled over all 6 1   sales.  Then the median price paid for boars of a
given index value ( 100 ,  ioi, 102 , 
...  140 )  was determined and plotted for each
breed.  The  median was  preferred to the mean  because  it is less affected by  occa-
sional very high prices.  The  plot is shown  in figure i, and the relation between
median price and index value can be seen to be very similar in the two breeds.
The curves are erratic  near index values of 140 .  This is  mainly because the
medians are based on very small numbers.  However, since a high proportion
of boars in this region are bought by  A.I. centres and breeders, this may  affect
the prices paid by  producers.  In both  breeds, price changes  little as index  values
rise from 100   to about no,  but then rises more  rapidly.  It has not  been thought
worthwhile to make a detailed  statistical  analysis of these prices.  Rather,  a
simple quadratic equation which can describe both relationships without doing
excessive violence to the data is  plotted in figure i.  The equation of the curve
is :
Clearly this simple equation describes the price-index relation reasonably well.
There is  evidence  (P.  5!!,!,I!x  and L.  Oi<T,iviE R ,  personal communication)
that the rate of genetic improvement in French pigs is about 5   index points per
year, and that an increase of one index point is worth about r. 5 o  francs per pig.Thus  if we  take our time unit as being 6 months, G is 2 . 5   index points per period,
and  B = 1 . 5   francs per  point.  Each  boar bought  could produce about 20 o  piglets
reared per period {P 
=  200 )  though  this may be somewhat high on average.
However, if we accept these values we have :
PBG  =  75o francs per period
Then since the price of an average boar is  1   500   francs, Q o  
= 2 .  Since S =
(I 
-  100 )  / 2 .5, the approximate price function (6)  can be rewritten as :
so that
On the other hand, the theory developed in the previous section predicts that
competition should tend to produce a price function in which :
This  would  give
The result would be extremely high prices for high-index boars.  For example,
the  price of a boar  with an  index of 140   would  be 121  5 0 o  francs under  this system
rather than the observed value of 2   500   francs.  It is thus clear that if the above
estimates are correct, French pig producers are able to buy genetically superior
boars very cheaply.
Assuming that boar prices can be adequately described by equation (6) :
and therefore :
Since S has an upper limit  of about 20 ,  1 
is  negative  unless T is  less than
one sixth and therefore it pays to buy  the best possible sires.  With  the existing
price structure producers could spend more to buy the best available  sires  in
competition  with  A.I.  centres  and breeders.  Also,
Supposing a producer buys  boars with an  index  value of Z4 o,  so that S = 1 6,
giving a stationary value when T 2  =  20  / 3   or T = 2 . 5 8. Thus, using the aboveestimates, a producer would be advised to buy  the best available sires and  to use
them  for about 2 . 5   periods or i 5   months  before replacing them  with the best sires
then available.  Boar purchase costs would then be about I   ooo francs per boar
used per period.
The above  discussion  suggests  that  genetically  superior  boars  are cheap
relative to average boars.  It is also of interest to see whether average boars are
cheap or expensive relative to their genetic value using the discounted gene now
procedure for  evaluation of  a purchased sire.
An  average sire costs 1   500   francs and  it is easily checked that the optimum
usage period is two time units or 12   months.  We  shall then assume that such
a  boar  has  progeny  born  on  average when  he  is 2 . 5   time units old.  If it is assumed
that the effects of sow selection in the producer’s population on lag can be ne-
glected the lag will be 2 1 B G  when average boars are bought so that R = 2 1 B G.
Then the net present value of an average boar is :
Letting  r = 0 . 95   corresponding to a discount rate of 10   per cent per annum or
5 per cent per time unit, and letting Y  =  i we have :
Sows are normally one year old at first litter with subsequent litters at 6 month
intervals.  We  may  then use the sow parity distribution reported by I,!GAUr,T,
DAGO RN   and T AS T U  ( 1975 )  to find the average age of sows.  The approximate
age distribution of farrowing sows would then be :
Age (6 month units) : 2 3   4  5 6 7 8  9
Percentage  27  21  17  13  9  6  4  3 .
The average age of dams would then be 4 . 05   time units.  Since the average of
sires is 2 . 5   time units this gives li3 
= 3 . 275   time units so that :
Using a discount rate of 5 per  cent for a 6 month  time unit,  r = 1  ¡ LOS   and  then :
from which J 
= 1 . 7010 .  Therefore :
N.P.V. =  2  2 88  francs
That is,  an average boar gives a sum of discounted returns in his descendants
of about 3  7 88  francs while costing  1   goo francs,  leaving a net value of about
2   2 88  francs to the  buyer.  Since average  sires are profitable and  better sires have
been shown to be cheap relative to average sires,  superior sires are clearly very
profitable, provided that the assumptions on which this analysis has been based
are correct.
Discussion
The analysis presented in this paper clearly has a number of limitations.
For the most part, attention has been concentrated on a steady state situation,
whereas in practice sire buyers will often, perhaps nearly always, have to makepurchase  decisions in a non-equilibrium context.  In  principle this problem  might
be approached by use of dynamic programming methods, but it is not obvious
how  to set up an appropriately general model.  In addition, the present inves-
tigation has considered sire purchase from a particular nucleus, whereas buyers
usually have a choice between  several, sometimes very many, sources of breeding
males.  If these are all improving at the same  rate, differences between nucleus
populations play the same role in the theory as differences within populations,
and  in principle this should lead to the same  relation between  price and breeding
value between and within nucleus populations.  If this is not so, a sire of given
breeding value will be cheaper in some studs than in others,  and the cheaper
sires should be favoured.  If the rate of genetic gain is  not the same in every
nucleus, then in the long run, that nucleus making most rapid progress should
become dominant and supply the great majority of  sires.  However,  if  three
are other nucleus populations which are initially superior, it may  be best to buy
sires from these in the early stages, buying from the nucleus making fastest pro-
gress only when  it has surpassed its competitors, though this will clearly depend
on prices.
The problem will be more complicated if the nucleus is producing breeding
stock for commercial populations which do not have the same economic weights
in all cases.  Each  sire would then have several breeding values,  different ones
for different potential buyers, and this would probably greatly complicate the
effect of price on  breeding  policies.  In fact, although it is hoped  that the results
of this study  will prove useful, there is obviously much  more  to be done  to clarify
the sire purchasing problem.
It is interesting to note  that when  the theory  is applied  to purchase  of French
boars the actual decisions made  buy  buyers seem far from optimal.  This would
not be surprising, since the optimal policy is  not easy to see, especially since it
involves varying time of use of a boar in relation to his breeding value and  price.
However, there are other possiblilities for the discrepancy.  One would be that
genetic gains are not being obtained at the rate assumed, or at least they are not
perceived as being obtained at that rate by  sire buyers.  This might be because
of disagreement about the genetic changes occurring or because of disagreement
about the economic value of the genetic changes which are taking place.
In addition, other economic factors may  modify the price relationship.  For
example, in a time when  the market  for produce  is poor, the incomes  of producers
will be low and they may  lack the finance necessary to pay very high prices for
superior sires.  Again, if there is an excess supply of sires, there may  be insuffi-
cient competition for the best ones to force those wishing to buy them to pay
high prices.
A  factor which  has not been accounted  for in the  above  analysis  is the  possible
resale value of sires.  It  is  unlikely that average sires would bring good prices
when resold by producers after use for a few time units, but sires of very high
breeding value used only for a short time by a producer could conceivably have
a resale value  of the same  order of magnitude  as less valuable sires bought  directly
from the nucleus, so that the net purchase price of highly selected sires would
be less than the actual purchase price.  The  complicating factor is that the price
on resale would decline with length of time the sire was  used, and  so  if this factor
were important, the optimum number of times to use a superior sire would be
reduced.  This aspect may deserve further study.
It has also been assumed that inbreeding may  be neglected.  In our  context,
this implies a producing population which is  large enough so that if  a superiorsire  is to be  used  many  times  it will be  possible  to avoid  mating  him  to  his daughters.
When  producing populations are too small for this the maximum  use of superior
sires will have  to be  less, and we  would expect the  price  differential  for high  breed-
ing value to be reduced.
However, although  the  present analysis  has  several  limitations, it does  suggest
a method of planning sire purchase and use,  and indicates the possibility that
good sires may  be rather cheap for the benefits they  confer in some  cases at least.
Received for publication in May - 9 8o.
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Résumé
L’analyse des  politiques  d’achat de  géniteurs
L’achat d’un géniteur sélectionné conduit à des gains de productivité dans  sa descendance.
Une expression de la valeur nette actualisée des recettes qui en résultent est établie. Cette ex-
pression est utile pour juger de la valeur d’un achat donné mais elle n’est pas suffisante pour
déterminer une politique générale d’achat de géniteurs. Dans ce but, une analyse est faite de
la valeur  d’un  achat  de  mâle  en  provenance  d’un  noyau  de  sélection qui  réalise des  gains  génétiques
constants quand  le retard de la population commerciale sur le noyau s’est stabilisé en fonction
d’une  politique donnée. Cela conduit à un  critère pour  décider de  la durée  d’utilisation d’un mâle,
qui  dépend  de  son  prix, de  sa  valeur  génétique  et du  progrès  génétique  dans  le noyau. La  politique
d’achat  optimale  dépend  de  la relation entre  le prix  et la valeur  génétique  du  mâle. La  concurrence
entre les acheteurs peut modifier la relation entre le prix et la valeur génétique, et aboutir à
une  relation telle que tous les pères ont la même  valeur nette actualisée à condition qu’ils soient
convenablement  utilisés. Il est montré que, dans  ce cas, le prix est une fonction de second degré
de la valeur génétique.
Les prix payés par les producteurs pour les verrats vendus aux enchères dans les stations
françaises de contrôle individuel sont liés à la valeur de l’indice  (I)  par la relation approchée :
Pour une telle fonction, la meilleure politique, pour le producteur, consiste à acheter des
verrats à haut  indice (environ ’4 o)  et à  les remplacer après une  utilisation de 15   mois. La  valeur
nette actualisée d’un verrat moyen est estimée à 2   ooo francs.
Appendix
Definitions  of  symbols
a  Age of sire one period before first progeny born.
A  Genetic  lag  between nucleus and base.
B  Economic worth of one unit of breeding value.C  Purchase cost of a sire.
d Discount  rate.
D MB (D FB )  Genetic  superiority  of  sires  (dams)  used  in  base.
e’  Row vector  ( I   o  ... o o), transpose  of  e.
f  f   Genetic contribution of jth female age group to progeny.
F  Female gene  flow  matrix.
G  Genetic gain per time unit.
I  Unit matrix.
J  Leading  term  of  matrix  (I 
- Y F)
k(S)  Cost of a sire with  superiority S relative to the cost of an average sire.
1 MB (l FB )  Average age of sires  (dams) used in base.
n  Number of  sires  bought per  period.
N  Number of  sires  in use at any one time.
P  Number of progeny per sire born in one period.
Q  Standardised purchase cost of a sire  =  C /PBG.
y   Discount factor =  i /(i + d).
R  Sire’s  breeding  value  relative  to  base  mean.
S  Standardised genetic  superiority of  a  sire = D MB   ,IG.
T  Maximum number of times a sire is  used.
U  Standardised variable cost =  V  /NPBG.
V  Variable cost  of  sire buying policy.
W  Survival rate of  sires  from one period to  the next.
Y  Age of progeny at which returns are realised.
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